CAN-BUS

Security Analysis of Controller Area Network Protocols based on Physical Properties of Electronic Control Units (ECUs)

About CAN-BUS

Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in a contemporary vehicle exchange data in order to control the vehicle more effectivly via in-vehicle network protocols such as Controller Area Network. These in-vehicle network protocols do not encrypt the data nor authenticate messages; thus the CAN bus is vulnerable to cyber attacks, in which the adversary may take full control of the vehicle. There is a need for developing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to detect attacks on the CAN bus by tracking abnormal deviations in physical properties of the CAN bus or ECUs to secure the CAN bus. We investigate various attack surfaces of the CAN bus and existing IDSs by exploiting vulnerabilities of the CAN protocol. Not limited to exploring attack surfaces, we develop defense mechanisms that detect attack and promptly mitigate the attacks to minimize the consequence of the attack. ...

Meet the Team

team member
Prof. Radha Poovendran
Principal Investigator

NSL Founding Director
Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Washington

team member
Prof. Linda Bushnell
Co-Principal Investigator

Research Professor
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Washington

team member
Sang Sagong
NSL Alumni

Network Security Lab Alumni

team member
Dr. Xuhang Ying
NSL Alumni

Software Engineer, Amazon

Publications

S. Sagong, R. Poovendran, L. Bushnell, "Inter-Message Correlation for Intrusion Detection in Controller Area Networks", 2019 Conference on Embedded Security in Cars (ESCAR) Europe, Stuttgart, Germany, November 19-20, 2019

X. Ying, G. Bernieri, M. Conti, and R. Poovendran, "TACAN: Transmitter Authentication through Covert Channels in Controller Area Networks". In Proceedings of 10th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS), Montreal, Canada, pp. 23-34, 2019.

X. Ying, S. Sagong, A. Clark, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, "Shape of the Cloak: Formal Analysis of ClockSkew-Based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 14:9, pp. 2300-2314, January 2019.

S. Sagong, X. Ying, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, “Exploring Attack Surfaces of Voltage-based Intrusion Detection Systems in Controller Area Networks”, in Embedded Security in Cars Europe, 2018.

S. Sagong, X. Ying, A. Clark, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, “Cloaking the Clock: Emulating Clock Skew in Controller Area Networks”, in ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, 2018, pp. 32–42.

CAN-BUS Project Sponsors

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National Science Foundation

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Office of Naval Research

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Army Research Office